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MULTI-GROUP BINARY CHOICE WITH SOCIAL INTERACTION
AND A RANDOM COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE – A RANDOM
GRAPH APPROACH
MATTHIAS LO¨WE, KRISTINA SCHUBERT, AND FRANCK VERMET
Abstract. We construct and analyze a random graph model for discrete choice with
social interaction and several groups of equal size. We concentrate on the case of two
groups of equal sizes and we allow the interaction strength within a group to differ
from the interaction strength between the two groups. Given that the resulting graph
is sufficiently dense we show that, with probability 1, the average decision in each
of the two groups is the same as in the fully connected model. In particular, we
show that there is a phase transition: If the interaction among a group and between
the groups is strong enough the average decision per group will either be positive or
negative and the decision of the two groups will be correlated. We also compute the
free energy per particle in our model.
1. Introduction
As the study of social phenomena, like decision making processes or voting, has be-
come the subject of various scientific disciplines, a variety of approaches has emerged
towards such topics. Accordingly, different aspects are stressed from an economic and
a sociological point of view: While the role of individual preferences (see [4]) is usually
in the focus af economic models, in sociological models individuals are regarded as
members of a group and the individual’s behaviour is essentially determined by the
behaviour of the group (see e.g. [11], [6]).
A unifying approach are so called social interaction models. First attempts to use
such models go back to Schelling [38]. Fo¨llmer [19] used the theory of Markov random
fields from statistical physics to furnish this approach with a rigorous mathematical
framework. In the 1990s and early 2000s interacting spins systems were discovered as a
model for (mostly binary) discrete choice problems with social interaction, see e.g. [10],
[17], [25], [13], [26], or [32]. From this list [10] is particularly interesting for our paper,
because it gives a reinterpretation of the Curie-Weiss model from statistical physics in
terms of discrete choice models with interactions. Our contribution will be to extend
this result to two groups and a random communication structure.
The considerations of decision making in more than one group, where the members
of one group interact with one interaction strength, while members of two groups
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interact with a different strength, led to so-called bipartite Curie-Weiss models, that
were analyzed in a statistical mechanics context, see e.g. see [21], [20], [18], [12], or [37].
These models were also considered from a statistical perspective recently by Berthet,
Rigollet and Srivastava [5] as a version of a statistical block model. Such block models
have been in the center of interest in statistics and probability theory over the past
couple of years (see, e.g. [1], [22], [5]). The statistical interest arises from their relation
to graphical models, while from a probabilistic point of view they can be considered
to model social interactions with respect to certain decisions, see e.g. [3]. In this
framework a major question is always how to reconstruct the block structure under
sparsity assumptions (see e.g. [9], [36], [8]).
In the model from [5], that has been studied earlier in [21], [18], and also later in [30],
[34], and [31] and that is interesting both from a probabilistic and a statistical perspec-
tive, one partitions the set {1, . . . , N} into a set S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} and its complement Sc.
This segmentation induces a partitioning of the binary hypercube {−1,+1}N , N ∈ N,
the state space of the Ising block model. The authors then consider a situation, where
the interaction between spins in S resp. in Sc is stronger than the interaction between
spins that belong to different blocks. In [5] the authors describe the statistical mechan-
ics of these models and show how to efficiently reconstruct the blocks S and Sc from
observations of the model. In the context of [5] the partitioning is always such that
|S| = N/2 (for N even) and that there are two blocks only. In some papers that were
cited above, e.g. [18], a more general set-up with variable block sizes and more than
two blocks was considered. In this more general situation it seems non-trivial to give
a verifiable condition for the existence of a phase transition and a description of the
equilibrium points (note, however, that some results were obtained in [33]). We will
therefore start with the situation described in [5] as a reference model.
The result in [5] are very nice and interesting. However, from the point of view of
graphical models as well as from the viewpoint of describing social interactions, their
model might be considered a bit simplistic, because every spin, i.e. every agent in the
two populations given by S and Sc, is interacting with every other agent like in the
Curie-Weiss model for ferromagnets (see [16]).
Indeed, this is also the set-up of the standard game theoretical models. Translated to
the situation analyzed in [5] this means, for β > 0 and α ≤ β their model is defined by
the Hamiltonian
H˜N,α,β(σ) := − β
2N
∑
i∼j
σiσj − α
2N
∑
i 6∼j
σiσj , σ ∈ {−1,+1}N (1.1)
and the corresponding Gibbs measure
µ˜N,α,β(σ) :=
e−H˜N,α,β(σ)∑
σ′ e
−H˜N,α,β(σ′)
=:
e−H˜N,α,β(σ)
Z˜N,α,β
. (1.2)
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Here we write i ∼ j, if either i, j ∈ S or i, j ∈ Sc and i 6∼ j, otherwise. Note that this
encodes interactions between every pair of spins.
One readily sees that the above model has a two-dimensional order parameter, the
vector of block magnetizations, m := mN := (mN1 , m
N
2 ), where
m1 := m
N
1 := m1(σ) :=
2
N
∑
i∈S
σi and m2 := m
N
2 := m2(σ) :=
2
N
∑
i/∈S
σi.
According to our interpretation of the model as a binary choice model (see the following
section), we will also call m the vector of group decisions or group opinions.
Indeed, one immediately sees that m is an order parameter, since the Hamiltonian is
handily rewritten as
H˜N,α,β(σ) = −N
8
(2αm1m2 + βm
2
1 + βm
2
2). (1.3)
In the next sections we will propose and analyze a model that is slightly more realistic
in the sense that interactions only take place between some of the spins while others
do not influence each other directly (corresponding to conditional independence of the
corresponding sites in a graphical model).
2. The Model
As mentioned above, the standard game theoretical model would be to consider groups
of agents such that all agents of all groups communicate with each other. In other
words, the communication structure is described by a complete graph. This contrasts
with the Walrasian equilibrium picture, i.e. the traditional concept of economic equi-
librium, in which all agents communicate with the Walrasian auctioneer but not with
each other directly. In this case the communication structure is star shaped with the
auctioneer as the center.
However, compared to these two extreme models, it seem more plausible to assume that
each agent communicates with some, though not all, other agents, thus interpolating
between the two aforementioned models. We follow the construction in [28], by assum-
ing that each pair of agents (i, j) communicates with probability p = pN (i.e. there
is a link between two agents with probability pN), if they are in the same group and
with probability q = qN , if they are in different groups. We assume that all these
links exist independently from all other links. The resulting communication structure
is then given by a corresponding inhomogeneous random graph model similar to [28].
More formally, we define indicator random variables εij ∈ {0, 1} for each pair of agents
that are in the same group, i.e. i ∼ j and, similarly, random variables δij ∈ {0, 1} for
each pair of agents that are in different groups, i.e. i 6∼ j. The variable εij resp. δij will
be 1, if agents i and j can communicate and 0 otherwise. We will assume
P(εij = 1) = 1− P(εij = 0) = pN , if i ∼ j
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and
P(δij = 1) = 1− P(δij = 0) = qN , if i 6∼ j.
For technical reasons we will assume that the communication structure is asymmetric,
i.e. εij and εji are not necessarily the same (and the same for the δ variables). The
case of an undirected graph, i.e. εij = εji and δij = δji, can be dealt with using some
additional arguments. For a concise review on random graphs in relation with economic
models see [27].
Although condition (3.2) and (3.3) are sufficient to define our model, we will specify
a probability space that allows us to consider the limit N → ∞. This is in particular
necessary since εij = εij(N), δij = δij(N), p = pN and q = qN depend on N . Here, we
follow the construction in [7]. Let (pN)N and (qN)N be given, non increasing sequences
with p1 = q1 = 1. For a fixed index (i, j) ∈ N × N we consider independent inhomo-
geneous Markov chains (εij(N))N∈N and (δij(N))N∈N on (Ωij ,Σij ,P) for Ωij = {0, 1}N
with transition probabilities
P(εij(N) = 0|εij(N − 1) = 0) = 0,
P(εij(N) = 1|εij(N − 1) = 0) = 0,
P(εij(N) = 0|εij(N − 1) = 1) = 1− pN
pN−1
, (2.1)
P(εij(N) = 1|εij(N − 1) = 1) = pN
pN−1
, (2.2)
resp.
P(δij(N) = 0|δij(N − 1) = 0) = 0,
P(δij(N) = 1|δij(N − 1) = 0) = 0,
P(δij(N) = 0|δij(N − 1) = 1) = 1− qN
qN−1
, (2.3)
P(δij(N) = 1|δij(N − 1) = 1) = qN
qN−1
. (2.4)
The probabilities in (2.1) and (2.2) resp. (2.3) and (2.4) are chosen such that they
imply (3.2) resp. (3.3). We consider the product probability space (Ω,Σ) with Ω :=∏
(i,j)∈N×NΩij ,Σ :=
∏
(i,j)∈N×NΣij and we set E := Ω × Ω. Then we consider (ε, δ) =
(ε(N), δ(N)) as a family of random variables on {(ε, δ) ∈ E : εij ∈ {0, 1}N for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . , N}, i ∼ jand δij ∈ {0, 1}N for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, i ≁ j}.
To describe the decision making process, each agent has the choice from a discrete
set of alternatives, which in our situation will be the set {−1,+1} as in [19, 10, 38].
E.g., agents may have to choose between two different product brands or between two
different political parties as in [29].
Now, we assume that for an agent i the choice σi maximizes a certain utility function
Ui : {−1,+1} → R. To interpolate between pure individual choice and pure peer
pressure decisions, we suppose that the utility function Ui has two components: an
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individual part Ii(σi), which only depends on σi, and a common piece Ci, which also
depends on the choices of all other individuals σj , j 6= i, that communicate with agent
i. We thus write
Ui(σi) := Ii(σi) + Ci(σi, {σj, j 6= i}). (2.5)
The choice of σi ∈ {−1, 1} implies that we can take Ii to be a linear function, which
we will write as
Ii(σi) = uiσi + hσi.
Here, h is the same for all agents and expresses the apriori tendency to vote “yes” or
“no”. We will exclusively consider the case h ≡ 0 for the same reasons as we will stick
to equal block sizes and two groups S and Sc, only: Otherwise even for the full model
precise conditions for the existence of a phase transition are unknown.
To model that individual tastes are heterogeneous we take our utility functions random
as in [24]. More precisely, we assume that (ui)i=1...N are i.i.d. random variables with
common distribution function F . As often we will assume that F has a logit distribution
(see e.g. [2]):
F (x) = P(ui ≤ x) := 1
1 + exp(−βx) . (2.6)
Here β > 0 describes the homogeneity of the preferences of the agents: Large values of
β describe a group in which the group members share similar tastes.
In order to describe the second component of our utility function Ui in (2.5) we need to
define a neighborhood Ni for each agent i. These are the individuals that directly com-
municate with agent i and hence have a direct influence on his or her utility function.
Mathematically speaking
Ni := {j | εij = 1 or δij = 1}.
We can partition Ni into those j that belong to the same group as i
N
∼
i := {j | εij = 1}
and those that belong to a different group
N
6∼
i := {j | δij = 1}.
Note that since our communication structure is random, so are the sets Ni, and in
particular, they will be different for different agents i. For the second part of our
utility function Ui, which we called Ci, we will assume an additive structure as in
[19, 10]:
Ci(σi, {σj , j ∈ Ni}) = C∼i (σi, {σj, j ∼ i}) + C 6∼i (σi, {σj , j 6∼ i})
=
1
pN
∑
j∈N ∼i
σjσi +
α
βpN
∑
j∈N 6∼i
σjσi.
Note that we normalized the interaction term stemming from C∼i by the expected
size of N ∼i , which is pN (upto a factor
1
2
). The second summand is also normalized
6 MATTHIAS LO¨WE, KRISTINA SCHUBERT, AND FRANCK VERMET
by the same factor pN , hence reflecting that typically members of different groups
have less influence on agent i’s choice than members of the same group (if qN <
pN). This choice in particular ensures that in the limit N → ∞ the social utility
Ci does not systematically dominate the individual utility Ii. Moreover, α is a real
parameter with |α| ≤ β. We added this parameter to also allow for contrasting votes
in the two groups. We divided the second summand by β to obtain a nice form of
the invariant measure, see the following section. Of course, one could imagine other
parameterizations, e.g. dividing the second summand by qN instead of pN or not
dividing by β. This would lead to other critical values for the parameters, but, of
course, it would not change the overall picture.
In approaching the equilibrium picture of the above model, we will now assume that
each agent i makes his or her choice σi by maximizing his or her utility function Ui as
given in (2.5). Observe that the second summand in Ui, i.e. Ci, depends on the choices
of all other agents in her neighborhood, σj , j 6= i, j ∈ Ni. To maximize Ui we will
therefore assume that all σj , j 6= i, j ∈ Ni are fixed and maximize Ui conditionally on
σj , j 6= i, j ∈ Ni. Then, given σj , j 6= i, j ∈ Ni, agent i will decide for σi = +1 if
Ii(+1) + Ci(+1, {σj, j ∈ Ni}) > Ii(−1) + Ci(−1, {σj , j ∈ Ni}).
This is obviously the case, if and only if
Ii(+1)− Ii(−1) > Ci(−1, {σj , j ∈ Ni})− Ci(+1, {σj, j ∈ Ni}),
which in turn is fulfilled, if and only if
ui > − 1
pN
∑
j∈N ∼
i
σj − α
βpN
∑
j∈N 6∼i
σj ,
where we set h ≡ 0.
The conditional probability of agent i choosing σi = 1, given all the other decisions
σj , j 6= i, j ∈ Ni, can therefore be computed as:
P(σi = +1|(σj)j∈Ni) = 1− P(ui ≤ −
1
pN
∑
j∈N ∼i
σj − α
βpN
∑
j∈N 6∼i
σj)
= 1− F (− 1
pN
∑
j∈N ∼i
σj − α
βpN
∑
j∈N 6∼i
σj). (2.7)
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If F is the logit distribution given by (2.6), our condition (2.7) turns into:
P(σi = +1| (σj)j∈Ni) =
exp βCi(+1, σj)
exp(βCi(+1, σj)) + exp(βCi(−1, σj)) (2.8)
=
exp[β
2
( 1
pN
∑
j∈N ∼i σj +
α
βpN
∑
j∈N 6∼
i
σj)]
exp[β
2
( 1
pN
∑
j∈N ∼
i
σj +
α
βpN
∑
j∈N 6∼i σj)] + exp[−
β
2
( 1
pN
∑
j∈N ∼
i
σj +
α
βpN
∑
j∈N 6∼i σj)]
=
exp[ β
2pN
∑
j∈N ∼i σj +
α
2pN
∑
j∈N 6∼i σj ]
exp[ β
2pN
∑
j∈N ∼i σj +
α
2pN
∑
j∈N 6∼i σj ] + exp[−
β
2pN
∑
j∈N ∼i σj −
α
2pN
∑
j∈N 6∼i σj ]
,
which is the form of a Glauber dynamics in statistical physics.
Note that still the decisions of the agents are taken randomly, which can be interpreted
as a heterogeneity in the decision taking within our population of the two groups.
However, it can also be understood as a randomness that is inherent in the agent’s
choice, because they are not acting completely rational.
Let us briefly discuss some particular choices of the parameters in this model: When
Ci is solely a function of σi the model reduces to the standard logit model. This is well
known from the literature on discrete choice models, see e.g. [2]. In contrast, if Ci indeed
depends on σj, j ∈ Ni the above equations (2.7) and (2.8) symbolize the influence of the
social environment on an agent’s decision via the conditional distribution P(σi|σj , j ∈
Ni).
As for the influence parameter β, for a very large value of β (i.e. the case β → ∞)
the model represents the classical utility maximizer. However, in this case the utility
is solely determined by the social utility function and completely ignores individual
tastes. Therefore the model could be expected to show very similar decisions for the
various individuals. This is to be contrasted with the case β = 0. Here agents will
choose any of the two possible decisions with equal probabilities. This is reflected in a
very heterogeneous picture of the decisions of the agents.
In order to interpolate between these two extremes, we study positive, but finite values
of β and we are particularly interested in how the behavior of the agents changes for
different values of β ∈ (0,∞).
Moreover, as we will see in our analysis the product of α and the limit of the ratio
qN/pN determines the mutual influence of the two groups.
3. The invariant measure
So far, we described how a fixed agent i takes his or her decision. A natural follow-up
question is, when the system is in equilibrium. Because of the interdependence of the
individual decisions this question is non-trivial.
Many approaches deal with a notion of equilibrium that is defined by self-consistency
of the actions or beliefs [10, 23, 26]. This notion of a static equilibrium defines a
configuration of decisions (σ∗i )i=1...N to be in a (static) equilibrium if, for each i, σ
∗
i is
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the best response to the decisions of the other agents σ∗j . That is
For all i = 1 . . . N, σ∗i ∈ argmax
σi∈−1,+1
Ui(σi, {σ∗j , j 6= i}).
Note, however, that such a definition of a “self-consistent equilibrium” is also static
in the sense that it gives no clue as to how such an equilibrium point can be reached.
Indeed, the mere existence of an equilibrium point does not imply that it can be reached
from some given starting configuration (which is not in equilibrium).
We will therefore take a dynamic approach and endow all agents with a Poisson clock.
When agent i’s alarm goes off at time t, she will take a new decision and update her
opinion σi according to (2.8). Here the σj , j ∈ Ni are the decisions of the other agents
at time t. In this way we can construct a continuous time Markov chain. This chain is
ergodic and by detailed balance it is immediately checked that its invariant measure is
given by the measure µ on the state space ΣN := {−1,+1}N :
µ(σ) := µN,α,β,ε,δ,S(σ) :=
e−HN,α,β,ε,δ,S(σ)∑
σ′ e
−HN,α,β,ε,δ,S(σ′) =:
e−HN,α,β,ε,δ,S(σ)
ZN,α,β,ε,δ,S
. (3.1)
Here the Hamiltonian of the Gibbs measure is defined by the following function on
ΣN := {−1,+1}N :
H(σ) := HN,α,β,ε,δ,S(σ) := − β
2Np
∑
i∼j
εijσiσj − α
2Np
∑
i 6∼j
δijσiσj , σ ∈ ΣN .
Moreover, let us quickly repeat our conditions on the parameters: We chose β > 0,
the set S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} has cardinality N
2
, and ε := εN := (εij)i,j⊂S or i,j⊂Sc and δ :=
δN := (δij)(i,j)∈S×Sc or (i,j)∈Sc×S are independent Bernoulli random variables. Moreover
the ε-variables and the δ-variables are independent from each other. Their distribution
is given by
P(εij = 1) = 1− P(εij = 0) = p = pN (3.2)
as well as
P(δij = 1) = 1− P(δij = 0) = q = qN (3.3)
and we will assume that p ≥ q and that |α| q
p
≤ β, to model that the influence within
a group is stronger than across two groups. Recall the construction of the underlying
probability space for the ε- and δ-variables in the previous section.
Moreover, the model described above implies that we will consider the so-called quenched
situation, where the realisations of ε and δ are tossed in advance and then fixed for the
rest of the considerations. Note that this constitutes a Ising block model on a directed
random graph. As mentioned above this is basically a way to make the computations
slightly more convenient. The undirected graph case can also be treated. Finally we
will take the liberty and omit indices, whenever we think that this is reasonable.
The goal will be to analyze this model (which is in the spirit of [35] e.g.) for pN and
qN large enough, to describe its statistical mechanics.
The first theorem we will prove is the following:
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Theorem 3.1. Assume that
pNN →∞ and that qN
pN
→ a ∈ [0, 1] as N →∞.
Then, there are subsets
E∗N ⊆ EN :=
{
(ε, δ) : ε ∈ {0, 1}(S×S)∪(Sc×Sc), δ ∈ {0, 1}S×Sc}
with
P(E∗) = 1 for E∗ := lim inf
N→∞
E∗N =
∞⋃
M=1
∞⋂
N=M
E∗N ,
such that for all sequences (ε, δ) ∈ E∗ the vector of group opinions m = (m1, m2)
satisfies:
• If β+ |αa| ≤ 2 the distribution of m under the Gibbs measure µN , i.e. µN ◦m−1
converges weakly to the Dirac measure in (0, 0).
• If β > 2 and αa = 0, then µN,β ◦ m−1 converges weakly to the mixture of
four Dirac measures 1
4
∑
v1,v2∈{±} δ(v1z∗(β2 ),v2z∗(β2 ))
. Here z∗(b) denotes the largest
solution of the Curie-Weiss equation
z = tanh(bz)
(which is positive, if b > 1).
• If β+αa > 2, αa > 0 and a 6= 0, the distribution of m under the Gibbs measure
µN,β converges weakly to the following mixture of two Dirac measures
1
2
∑
v∈{±}
δ(vz∗(β+αa
2
),vz∗(β+αa
2
)).
• If β+αa > 2, αa < 0 and a 6= 0, the distribution of m under the Gibbs measure
µN,β converges weakly to the following mixture of two Dirac measures
1
2
∑
v∈{±}
δ(vz∗(β+αa
2
),−vz∗(β+αa
2
)).
Theorem 3.1 tells us that there is a phase transition for the vector of group opinions.
If both, β and |aα| are small enough, i.e. if β + |αa| ≤ 2, then on a set with huge
probability for both groups the average group opinion will behave as if decisions were
taken independently with probability 1/2 for +1 and −1 (however, the fluctuations
are different). If β > 2 and αa = 0, there are four different limit points for the group
opinions. This is reasonable because each group behaves similar to a Curie-Weiss
model at low temperature (where there are two limit points of the magnetizations) and
αa = 0 indicates that the group opinions are asymptotically independent. If β > 2 and
|αa| > 0, there are two possible non-zero limit points for the vector of group opinions
and the decisions of the two groups are positively correlated, if αa > 0 and negatively
correlated, when αa < 0.
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We will prove Theorem 3.1 in the next section. We will also mention a consequence of
our proof that allows to derive the free energy of our model.
4. Proof of Theorem 3.1
In this section we will prove Theorem 3.1. Its proof basically relies on the law of large
numbers for the coupling variables ε and δ. More precisely, we consider subsets of EN ,
for which there are large subsets of the vertices in which there are much more or much
less edges than expected. These sets have exponentially small probabilities. A similar
argument was made in [7].
For a fixed configuration σ ∈ {±1}N let us introduce the sets of sites aligned and
unaligned spins, both within the same block (indicated by the subscript ‘b’ in the
notation below) and in different blocks (indicated by the subscript ‘nb’ for ‘not the
same block’ below). These are denoted by
L±b (σ) := {i ∼ j : σiσj = ±1}
as well as
L±nb(σ) := {i 6∼ j : σiσj = ±1}.
Then we are able to express H˜N,α,β(σ) in terms of L
+
b and L
+
nb, only. Indeed: Note that
m21 +m
2
2 =
4
N2

∑
i,j∈S
σiσj +
∑
i,j /∈S
σiσj

 = 4
N2
(|L+b | − |L−b |)
=
4
N2
(
|L+b | −
(
2
N2
4
− |L+b |
))
=
8
N2
|L+b | − 2.
Hence
|L+b | =
N2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2). (4.1)
Similarly,
m1m2 =
4
N2
(∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Sc
σiσj
)
=
2
N2
(|L+nb| − |L−nb|)
=
2
N2
(
|L+nb| −
N2
2
+ |L+nb|
)
=
4
N2
|L+nb| − 1.
This gives
|L+nb| =
N2
4
(m1m2 + 1).
Analogously,
m1m2 =
2
N2
(|L+nb| − |L−nb|)
=
2
N2
(
N2
2
− 2|L+nb|
)
= 1− 4
N2
|L−nb|.
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Thus
|L−nb| =
N2
4
(1−m1m2). (4.2)
On the other hand, making use of∑
i∼j
εijσiσj =
∑
i∼j
εijσiσj1i,j∈L+
b
+
∑
i∼j
εijσiσj1i,j∈L−
b
=
∑
i∼j
εij1i,j∈L+
b
−
∑
i∼j
εij(1− 1i,j∈L+
b
)
=
∑
i∼j
εij(21i,j∈L+
b
− 1)
=
∑
i∼j
εij21i,j∈L+
b
−
∑
i∼j
εij
and a similar observation for
∑
i 6∼j δijσiσj we can rewrite the Hamiltonian in terms of
L+b and L
+
nb:
H(σ) = − β
2Np
∑
i∼j
εijσiσj − α
2Np
∑
i 6∼j
δijσiσj (4.3)
= − 1
2Np
(∑
i∼j
2βεij1i,j∈L+
b
−
∑
i∼j
βεij +
∑
i 6∼j
2αδij1i,j∈L+
nb
−
∑
i 6∼j
αδij
)
.
In the same way, we can find an expression for H(σ) that uses L−nb instead of L
+
nb:
H(σ) = − 1
2Np
(∑
i∼j
2βεij1i,j∈L+
b
−
∑
i∼j
βεij +
∑
i 6∼j
αδij −
∑
i 6∼j
2αδij1i,j∈L−
nb
)
. (4.4)
We will thus show that for a subset of EN with huge probability the sizes of the sets
L+b and L
+
nb or L
+
b and L
−
nb are of the order we would expect them to be. The point,
why we just need L+b , but both, L
+
nb and L
−
nb, is that L
+
b is automatically of order N
2,
while L+nb or L
−
nb may be of much smaller order, but they cannot both be small.
More precisely, for two sequences γN > 0 and κN > 0 that we will specify in the
following proposition we define
E∗N := E∗b,N ∩ E∗nb+,N ∩ E∗nb−,N
= (E∗b,N ∩ E∗nb+,N) ∩ (E∗b,N ∩ E∗nb−,N)
Here
E∗b,N :=
{
(ε, δ) ∈ E : ∀σ ∈ {±1}N :
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∼j
εij1i,j∈L+
b
− pN |L+b |
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γNpN |L+b |
}
,
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E∗nb+,N :={
(ε, δ) ∈ E : ∀σ ∈ {±1}Nwith m1(σ)m2(σ) ≥ 0 :
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∼j
δij1i,j∈L+
nb
− qN |L+nb|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ κNqN |L+nb|
}
,
as well as
E∗nb−,N :={
(ε, δ) ∈ E : ∀σ ∈ {±1}Nwith m1(σ)m2(σ) < 0 :
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∼j
δij1i,j∈L−
nb
− qN |L−nb|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ κNqN |L−nb|
}
.
Finally set
E∗,+N := E∗b,N ∩ E∗nb+,N and E∗,−N := E∗b,N ∩ E∗nb−,N .
The desired set E∗ is now given by the lim inf of the sets E∗N :
E∗ := lim inf
N→∞
E∗N =
∞⋃
M=1
∞⋂
N=M
E∗N .
We now show that E∗ has full probability:
Proposition 4.1. If pN and qN satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 and γN ≥ c√pNN
and κN ≥ d√qNN for some c, d > 0 to be chosen later and γN as well as κN tend to 0,
then
P(E∗) = 1.
Not unexpectedly Proposition 4.1 will follow from an estimate for the probabilities of
E∗N and the Borel-Cantelli-Lemma. The needed estimate for the proof of Proposition
4.1 is provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Under the assumptions of Proposition 4.1 we have that there exist two
constants C1, C2 > 0 such that for all N large enough
P((E∗N)c) ≤ 4C1N2 exp(−C2N).
Proof. Assume that (ε, δ) /∈ E∗N . Then there exists a σ ∈ {±1}N such either∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∼j
εij1i,j∈L+
b
(σ) − pN |L+b (σ)|
∣∣∣∣∣ > γNpN |L+b (σ)|
or ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∼j
δij1i,j∈L+
nb
(σ) − qN |L+nb(σ)|
∣∣∣∣∣ > κNqN |L+nb(σ)|, m1(σ)m2(σ) ≥ 0.
or ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∼j
δij1i,j∈L−
nb
(σ) − qN |L−nb(σ)|
∣∣∣∣∣ > κNqN |L−nb(σ)|, m1(σ)m2(σ) < 0.
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Hence by a union bound
P((E∗N)c) ≤
∑
σ:m1m2≥0
P(AN(σ)) + P(BN(σ)) + P(CN(σ)) + P(DN(σ)) (4.5)
+
∑
σ:m1m2<0
P(AN(σ)) + P(BN(σ)) + P(C
′
N(σ)) + P(D
′
N(σ)).
Here
AN(σ) := {(ε, δ) :
∑
i∼j
εij1i,j∈L+
b
≥ pN (1 + γN)|L+b |},
BN(σ) := {(ε, δ) :
∑
i∼j
εij1i,j∈L+
b
≤ pN (1− γN)|L+b |},
CN(σ) := {(ε, δ) :
∑
i∼j
δij1i,j∈L+
nb
≥ qN(1 + κN )|L+nb|},
DN(σ) := {(ε, δ) :
∑
i∼j
δij1i,j∈L+
nb
≤ qN(1− κN)|L+nb|}
C ′N(σ) := {(ε, δ) :
∑
i∼j
δij1i,j∈L−
nb
≥ qN(1 + κN )|L−nb|} and
D′N(σ) := {(ε, δ) :
∑
i∼j
δij1i,j∈L−
nb
≤ qN(1− κN)|L−nb|}.
Defining the relative entropy
Ip(x) = x log
x
p
+ (1− x) log (1− x)
(1− p) and
Iq(x) = x log
x
q
+ (1− x) log (1− x)
(1− q) ,
we obtain by an exponential Chebyshev inequality
P(AN) ≤ exp
(−|L+b (σ)|Ip(pN (1 + γN))) ,
P(BN) ≤ exp
(−|L+b (σ)|Ip(pN (1− γN))) ,
P(CN) ≤ exp
(−|L+nb(σ)|Iq(qN(1 + κN ))) ,
P(DN) ≤ exp
(−|L+nb(σ)|Iq(qN(1− κN))) ,
P(C ′N) ≤ exp
(−|L−nb(σ)|Iq(qN(1 + κN ))) and
P(D′N) ≤ exp
(−|L−nb(σ)|Iq(qN(1− κN))) .
In order to keep the notation simple, here we write Ip instead of IpN in the last formula
and Iq instead of IqN . Note that Ip(x) is always positive. Moreover, the quantities
|L+b (σ)|, |L+nb(σ)|, and |L−nb(σ)| can be expressed in terms of the vector of magnetizations
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m as observed in (4.1) to (4.2):
|L+b | =
N2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2)
as well as
|L+nb| =
N2
4
(m1m2 + 1)
and
|L−nb| =
N2
4
(1−m1m2).
We will start by estimating the contributions from the first line in (4.5). Thus de-
composing this first sum in (4.5) according to which vector of magnetizations m(σ) we
obtain from σ and applying the exponential bounds derived above, we arrive at:
P((E∗,+N )c) ≤
∑
σ
m1(σ)m2(σ)≥0
P(AN(σ)) + P(BN(σ)) + P(CN(σ)) + P(DN(σ))
=
∑
m1,m2
m1m2≥0
∑
σ:m1(σ)=m1 ,m2(σ)=m2
P(AN(σ)) + P(BN(σ)) + P(CN(σ)) + P(DN(σ))
≤
∑
m1,m2
m1m2≥0
( N
2
N
4
(1 +m1)
)( N
2
N
4
(1 +m2)
)
×
×
{
exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2)Ip(pN(1 + γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2)Ip(pN(1− γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2 + 1)Iq(qN (1 + κN ))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2 + 1)Iq(qN(1− κN))
)}
.
Here and in the sequel, the sums overm1 andm2 are over such values for themi that are
admissible magnetizations for the given N . More precisely, admissible magnetizations
means that for N
2
even we consider N
2
m1,
N
2
m2 ∈ {0,±2,±4, . . . ,±N2 } and for N2 odd
we consider N
2
m1,
N
2
m2 ∈ {±1,±3, . . . ,±N2 }.
By Stirling’s formula 1 ≤ n!√
2pin(n
e
)n
≤ 2 we have for γ ∈ (0, 1) such that γM is an
integer(
M
γM
)
≤ C
√
M(M/e)M√
γMγγMMγM
√
(1− γ)M(1− γ)(1−γ)MM (1−γ)M (1/e)M (4.6)
= C
1√
γ(1− γ)M exp(−M(γ log γ + (1− γ) log(1− γ))) (4.7)
for some constant C > 0. Recall that we want to apply this estimate toM = N
2
and γ =
1+m1
2
resp. γ = 1+m2
2
, i.e. γ takes values in the set Γ1 := {12 , 12± 2N , 12± 4N , . . . , 12±(12− 2N )}
for N
2
even resp. in the set Γ2 := {12± 1N , 12± 3N , . . . , 12± (12− 1N )} for N2 odd (in addition
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to γ = 0 and γ = 1). Hence, for γ ∈ Γ1 ∪ Γ2 and M = N2 we have
1√
γ(1− γ)M → 0 for M →∞.
Hence, for M = N
2
large and γ ∈ Γ1 ∪ Γ2, we have
(
M
γM
)
≤ C exp(−M(γ log γ + (1− γ) log(1− γ))).
Here, the above estimate is also trivially true for γ = 0 and γ = 1, where we set
0 log 0 = 0. Applying this to the above binomial coefficients
( N
2
N
4
(1+m1)
)
resp.
( N
2
N
4
(1+m2)
)
yields
P((E∗,+N )c) ≤
∑
m1,m2
m1m2≥0
C exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m1
2
log
(
1 +m1
2
)
+
1−m1
2
log
(
1−m1
2
)))
× exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m2
2
log
(
1 +m2
2
)
+
1−m2
2
log
(
1−m2
2
)))
×
{
exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2)Ip(pN(1 + γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2)Ip(pN(1− γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2 + 1)Iq(qN(1 + κN ))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2 + 1)Iq(qN(1− κN))
)}
=
∑
m1,m2
m1m2≥0
C2N exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m1
2
log(1 +m1) +
1−m1
2
log(1−m1)
))
× exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m2
2
log(1 +m2) +
1−m2
2
log(1−m2)
))
×
{
exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2)Ip(pN(1 + γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2)Ip(pN (1− γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2 + 1)Iq(qN(1 + κN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2 + 1)Iq(qN (1− κN ))
)}
.
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We now may separate the terms that do not depend on the vector m. This gives the
bound
exp(N log 2) exp(−N
2
4
I0)∑
m1,m2:
m1m2≥0
exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m1
2
log(1 +m1) +
1−m1
2
log(1−m1)
))
× exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m2
2
log(1 +m2) +
1−m2
2
log(1−m2)
))
×
{
exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2)Ip(pN(1 + γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2)Ip(pN(1− γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2)Iq(qN (1 + κN ))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2)Iq(qN(1− κN))
)}
,
where we have set
I0 := I0(N) := min{Ip(pN(1 + γN)), Ip(pN(1− γN)), Iq(qN(1 + κN )), Iq(qN (1− κN )).
Obviously all the terms in the sum are bounded by 1, such that the entire sum is at
most
∑
m1,m2:
m1m2≥0
exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m1
2
log(1 +m1) +
1−m1
2
log(1−m1)
))
× exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m2
2
log(1 +m2) +
1−m2
2
log(1−m2)
))
×
{
exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2)Ip(pN(1 + γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2)Ip(pN(1− γN))
)
+exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2)Iq(qN(1 + κN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(m1m2)Iq(qN(1− κN ))
)}
≤ 4#{(m1, m2) : m1m2 ≥ 0} = 2
(
N
2
+ 1
)2
. (4.8)
It thus remains to show that exp(N log 2) exp(−N2
4
I0) is exponentially small in N .
Computing the terms contributing to I0 we see that
Ip(pN(1 + γN)) = pN(1 + γN) log(1 + γN) + (1− pN)
(
1− pNγN
1− pN
)
log
(
1− pNγN
1− pN
)
Ip(pN(1− γN)) = pN(1− γN) log(1− γN) + (1− pN )
(
1 +
pNγN
1− pN
)
log
(
1 +
pNγN
1− pN
)
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as well as
Iq(qN(1 + κN )) = qN(1 + κN) log(1 + κN) + (1− qN)
(
1− qNκN
1− qN
)
log
(
1− qNκN
1− qN
)
Iq(qN(1− κN)) = qN (1− κN ) log(1− κN) + (1− qN)
(
1 +
qNκN
1− qN
)
log
(
1 +
qNκN
1− qN
)
.
By Taylor expansion of the log function we have
(1 + x) log(1 + x) ≥ x+ x
2
2
(1− x
3
) and (1− x) log(1− x) ≥ −x
as well as
(1 + x) log(1 + x) ≥ x and (1− x) log(1− x) ≥ −x+ x
2
2
for 0 ≤ x < 1.
Using these inequalities to estimate Ip(pN(1 + γN)) and Ip(pN(1 − γN)), respectively,
we obtain
Ip(pN(1 + γN)) ≥ pN γ
2
N
2
(1− γN
3
) ≥ pN γ
2
N
3
(for N large enough) and
Ip(pN(1− γN)) ≥ (1− pN) pNγN
1− pN + pN (−γN +
γ2N
2
) = pN
γ2N
2
.
Similarly,
Iq(qN (1 + κN)) ≥ qN κ
2
N
2
(1− κN
3
) ≥ qN κ
2
N
3
(for N large enough) and
Iq(qN(1− κN)) ≥ (1− qN ) qNκN
1− qN + qN(−κ +
κ2N
2
) = qN
κ2N
2
.
Therefore
−N
4
I0 ≤ max(−NpN γ
2
N
12
,−NqN κ
2
N
12
).
Thus if we choose c = d such that c2 > 12 log 2 we see that
log 2− N
4
I0 < 0.
Therefore we obtain that indeed we can find constants C1, C2 > 0 such that
P((E∗,+N )c) ≤ 4C1N2 exp(−C2N).
We now turn to estimating the second sum in (4.5): Applying the exponential estimates
for the sets C ′N(σ) and D
′
N(σ) together with (4.2) we obtain
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P((E∗,−N )c) ≤
∑
σ
m1m2<0
P(AN(σ)) + P(BN(σ)) + P(C
′
N(σ)) + P(D
′
N(σ))
=
∑
m1,m2:
m1m2<0
∑
σ:m1(σ)=m1 ,m2(σ)=m2
P(AN (σ)) + P(BN(σ)) + P(C
′
N(σ)) + P(D
′
N (σ))
=
∑
m1,m2:
m1m2<0
( N
2
N
4
(1 +m1)
)( N
2
N
4
(1 +m2)
)
×
×
{
exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2)Ip(pN(1 + γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2 + 2)Ip(pN(1− γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(1−m1m2)Iq(qN(1 + κN ))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
4
(1−m1m2)Iq(qN (1− κN ))
)}
≤ exp(N log 2) exp(−N
2
4
I0)
∑
m1,m2:
m1m2≤0
exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m1
2
log(1 +m1) +
1−m1
2
log(1−m1)
))
× exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m2
2
log(1 +m2) +
1−m2
2
log(1−m2)
))
×
{
exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2)Ip(pN(1 + γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2)Ip(pN(1− γN))
)
+ exp
(
N2
4
(m1m2)Iq(qN (1 + κN))
)
+ exp
(
N2
4
(m1m2)Iq(qN(1− κN))
)}
,
Now as in (4.8)
∑
m1,m2:
m1m2≤0
exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m1
2
log(1 +m1) +
1−m1
2
log(1−m1)
))
× exp
(
−N
2
(
1 +m2
2
log(1 +m2) +
1−m2
2
log(1−m2)
))
×
{
exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2)Ip(pN(1 + γN))
)
+ exp
(
−N
2
8
(m21 +m
2
2)Ip(pN(1− γN))
)
+ exp
(
N2
4
(m1m2)Iq(qN (1 + κN))
)
+ exp
(
N2
4
(m1m2)Iq(qN(1− κN))
)}
≤ 4#{(m1, m2) : m1m2 ≤ 0} = 2
(
N
2
+ 1
)2
. (4.9)
Indeed, there is a one to one correspondence between the sums considered in (4.8) and
(4.9). By flipping all the spins in one of the blocks in (4.9) we get one summand in (4.8),
and by this we at the same time change the contribution of the e
N2
4
(m1m2)Iq(...)-terms in
(4.9) to e−
N2
4
(m1m2)Iq(...) as they appear (4.8). The rest of the terms remains unaltered.
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It thus remains to show that exp(N log 2) exp(−N2
4
I0) is exponentially small in N , but
these terms do not depend on m and we already showed in the first step of the proof
that we can make this term exponentially small by choosing γN and κN large enough.
This proves the assertion. 
Proposition 4.1 now follows immediately:
Proof of Proposition 4.1. : Just apply the Borel-Cantelli Lemma. The previous lemma
states that
P((E∗N)c) ≤ 4C1N2 exp(−C2N).
for some constants C1, C2 > 0. The right hand side is summable, hence (E∗)c has
probability 0. 
We now start with the proof of Theorem 3.1. Consider the Hamiltonian of the block
spin Curie-Weiss model treated in [5] defined in (1.1) and take λ = λN = α
qN
pN
in place
of the α in (1.1), i.e. we consider
H˜N,λ,β(σ) := − β
2N
∑
i∼j
σiσj − λ
2N
∑
i 6∼j
σiσj , σ ∈ {−1,+1}N
and the corresponding Gibbs measure. Note that λ may depend on N and that ac-
cording to our assumptions we always have that 0 ≤ |λ| < β if N is large enough. The
results obtained on the statistical mechanics of this model are stated in Theorem 4.3
below. There λ is fixed, but they automatically generalize to the situation with λN
converging to some fixed value. This fixed value in our case is, of course given by αa.
We will write
HN,α,β,ε,δ,S(σ) =: H˜N,αa,β(σ)−HN(σ).
For σ with m1(σ)m2(σ) ≥ 0 we can make use of (4.3) and a similar way to rewrite the
Hamiltonian H˜N,αa,β,S(σ) (which is obtained by simply setting all εij and δij to 1 and
changing the pre-factor in front of the second term) to obtain
|HN (σ)| = |HN,α,β,ε,δ,S(σ)− H˜N,αa,β(σ)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣− β2Np
[∑
i∼j
2εij1i,j∈L+
b
−
∑
i∼j
εij
]
− α
2Np
[∑
i 6∼j
2δij1i,j∈L+
nb
−
∑
i 6∼j
δij
]
+
β
2N
[∑
i∼j
21i,j∈L+
b
− N
2
2
]
+
αa
2N
[∑
i 6∼j
21i,j∈L+
nb
− N
2
2
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣ β2Np
∑
i∼j
2εij1i,j∈L+
b
− β
N
|L+b |
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ β2Np
∑
i∼j
εij − βN
4
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣ α2Np
∑
i∼j
2δij1i,j∈L+
nb
− αa
N
|L+nb|
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ α2Np
∑
i 6∼j
δij − αaN
4
∣∣∣∣∣ .
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From Proposition 4.1 we obtain that for all (ε, δ) ∈ E∗, all N ∈ N sufficiently large,
and all σ ∈ ΣN we have that∣∣∣∣∣ β2Np
∑
i∼j
2εij1i,j∈L+
b
− β
N
|L+b |
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ βγN |L
+
b |
N
≤ βγNN
2
(4.10)
by just multiplying the defining property for E∗b,N by βNp and crudly estimating |L+b | by
N2
2
. In the same way ∣∣∣∣∣ β2Np
∑
i∼j
εij − βN
4
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ βγNN2
which we get from (4.10) by considering the configuration σi ≡ 1.
Applying the same trick to the defining property of E∗nb+,N we obtain forN large enough
and all σ ∣∣∣∣∣ α2Np
∑
i∼j
2δij1i,j∈L+
nb
− αqN
pNN
|L+nb|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ακN qNpN
|L+nb|
N
.
By assumption qN
pN
→ a such that for any ε > 0 and N large enough qN
pN
∈ (a−ε, a+ ε).
Thus ∣∣∣∣∣ α2Np
∑
i∼j
2δij1i,j∈L+
nb
− αa
N
|L+nb|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ αaκNN
as well as ∣∣∣∣∣ α2Np
∑
i 6∼j
δij − αaN
4
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ αaκNN.
These estimates together yield
|HN(σ)| ≤ βγNN + 2aακNN (4.11)
for N large enough and all σ ∈ ΣN .
If σ ∈ ΣN satisfies m1(σ)m2(σ) < 0, we use (4.4) together with similar computations
to again obtain
|HN(σ)| ≤ βγNN + 2aακNN.
We will show in the rest of this section, how the bound on |HN(σ)| allows to transfer
the Law of Large Numbers for m proved in [5] to our situation. There the authors
show
Theorem 4.3. cf. [5, Proposition 4.1] Consider the model with Hamiltonian
H˜N,λ,β(σ) := − β
2N
∑
i∼j
σiσj − λ
2N
∑
i 6∼j
σiσj , σ ∈ {−1,+1}N
and the corresponding Gibbs measure
µ˜N,λ,β(σ) =
e−H˜N,λ,β(σ)
Z˜N,λ,β
.
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assume that |λ| < β and denote by ρ˜N,λ,β the distribution of m under the Gibbs measure
µ˜N,λ,β. Then
• If β + |λ| ≤ 2, then ρ˜N,λ,β weakly converges to the Dirac measure in (0, 0).
• If β + |λ| > 2 and λ = 0, then ρ˜N,λ,β weakly converges to the mixture of Dirac
measures 1
4
∑
s1,s2∈{−,+} δ(s1m+(β/2),s2m+(β/2)).
• If β + |λ| > 2 and λ > 0, then ρ˜N,λ,β weakly converges to the mixture of Dirac
measures 1
2
(δ(m+(λ+β
2
),m+(λ+β
2
)) + δ(−m+(λ+β
2
),−m+(λ+β
2
))).
• If β + |λ| > 2 and λ < 0, then ρ˜N,λ,β weakly converges to the mixture of Dirac
measures 1
2
(δ(m+(β−λ
2
),−m+(β−λ
2
)) + δ(−m+(β−λ
2
),m+(β−λ
2
))).
Of course, we will apply this result with λ = αa. We will transfer it to our situation
with the help of the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. As in the previous theorem let ρ˜N,αa,β be the distribution of m under the
measure µ˜N,αa,β and let ρN the distribution of m under the measure µN . Then for all
m = (m1, m2) and all realizations of the random graph (ε, δ) ∈ E∗ we have that
exp (−2N(βγN + 2αaκN)) ρ˜N,αa,β(m) ≤ ρN (m) ≤ exp (2N(βγN + 2αaκN)) ρ˜N,αa,β(m)
Proof. The statement of the lemma follows immediately, if we consider the form of the
Gibbs measures (1.2) and (3.1) together with the above estimate on the difference of
the Hamiltonians (4.11) which we need to apply to the numerator and denominator in
the definition (3.1). 
The final observation we now need to make in order to finish the proof of Theorem 3.1
is that the vector m obeys a principle of large deviations (LDP, for short) under µ˜N,λ,β.
Indeed the following holds:
Theorem 4.5. (see [34] Theorem 2.1)
For every S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} with |S| = N
2
the vector m obeys a principle of large devia-
tions (LDP) under the Gibbs measure µ˜N,λ,β, with speed N and rate function
Jm(x) := sup
y∈R2
[Fm(y)− J(y)]− [Fm(x)− J(x)].
Here Fm : R
2 → R is defined by
Fm(x) =
1
2
(
βx21 + βx
2
2 + 2λx1x2
)
.
Moreover,
J(x) :=
1
2
I (2x1) +
1
2
I (2x2)
for x ∈ R2. Here
I(x) :=
1
2
(1 + x) log(1 + x) +
1
2
(1− x) log(1− x).
This implies that the convergence in Theorem 4.3 (for 0 ≤ |λ| ≤ β) is exponentially
fast.
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Proof. In [34] we give a full proof of this result. Therefore, we just sketch the proof
here. The main idea is to first prove an LDP for m under the uniform distribution on
σ ∈ ΣN . This is not very difficult. One way to obtain it is to compute logarithmic
moment generating function and apply the Ga¨rtner-Ellis Theorem [14, Theorem 2.3.6].
Once the LDP for m under the uniform measure is established, the theorem follows
immediately from the exponential form of the Gibbs measure µ˜N,λ,β (see (1.2)), the fact
that H˜N,λ,β can be expressed as a continuous and bounded function of the vector m
(see (1.3)), and the LDP for integrals of exponential functions (see e.g. [15, Theorem
III.17] – a direct consequence of Varadhan’s Lemma [14, Theorem 4.3.1]. 
Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.5 imply an LDP for m also under the measure µN,α,β,ε,δ.
Corollary 4.6. For every S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} with |S| = N
2
and every realization of the
disorder (ε, δ) ∈ E∗ the vector m obeys an LDP under µN,α,β,ε,δ, with speed N and rate
function Jam(x). Here J
a
m(x) is defined as Jm(x) in Theorem 4.5, where one replaces λ
in the definition of Fm by αa.
Proof. From Lemma 4.4 for a closed subset A ⊆ R2 we have that
lim sup
N
1
N
log ρN,α,β,ε,δ(A) ≤ lim sup
N
1
N
log(ρ˜N,aα,β(A)e
2N(βγN+2aακN ))
≤ inf
x∈A
Jam(x) + lim sup
N
2(βγN + 2aακN)
and the second summand on the right hand side is 0 according to the assumptions on
γN and κN . The lower bound for open sets is obtained analogously. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Together with the previous results from this section, a decisive
observation is now the following: While in [34] – in view of a generalization of the model
– we were striving for a computation of the zeros of the rate function Jm without using
Theorem 4.3, with Theorem 4.3 at hand these zeros can be immediately read off: They
are exactly the limit points given in Theorem 4.3. This follows from the general fact
that a LDP always implies a Law of Large Numbers: This Law of Large Numbers may
be weak (whether there is a Strong Law of Large Numbers depends on the speed in
the LDP) and it may be a generalized Law of Large Numbers in the sense that there is
more than one limit point. However, the limit points of this generalized Law of Large
Numbers are always the zeros of the rate function.
Now since we know the zeros of the rate function in the LDP for ρ˜N,aα,β we also know
the zeros of the rate function in the LDP for ρN,α,β,ε,δ, because they are the same. But
this means that m converges under µN,α,β,ε,δ to the same limit points as under µ˜N,aα,β
provided that (ε, δ) ∈ E∗ and a = limN→∞ qNpN . But this is the statement of Theorem
3.1.

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Finally, we show that our above results allow to approximate the partition function
and to compute the limiting free energy per agent. Indeed, Proposition 4.1 allows to
approximate ZN,α,β,S for a large subset of the realizations of the disorder. We prove
Lemma 4.7. For any fixed disorder (ε, δ) ∈ E∗, i.e. with probability one, under the
condition that limN→∞ α
qn
pN
= a, the partition function ZN,α,β,ε,δ,S can be approximated
by the partition function Z˜N,a,β in the following way:
exp (−βγNN − 2aακNN) Z˜N,aα,β ≤ ZN,α,β,ε,δ,S ≤ exp (βγNN + 2aακNN) Z˜N,aα,β.
Proof. The estimate is an immediate consequence of the estimated uniform difference
between the Hamiltonians H and H˜ on E∗, i.e. (4.11). 
As an immediate consequence we obtain that for all configurations (ε, δ) ∈ E∗ the free
energy of our model exists and equals the free energy of the model treated in [5].
Corollary 4.8. In our model, for each fixed disorder (ε, δ) ∈ E∗, i.e. with probability
one, the free energy
f := lim
N→∞
1
N
logZN,α,β,ε,δ,S
exists and satisfies
f = f˜ := lim
N→∞
1
N
log Z˜N,aα,β.
Proof. This is obvious from Lemma 4.7 and the fact that γN and κN converge to 0, as
N →∞. 
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